





Rudy Douven, Rein Halbersma,
Katalin Katona and Victoria Shestalova
CPB Discussion Paper | 172  
 
 






Vertical integration and exclusive vertical 
restraints between insurers and hospitals 
 
 
Rudy Douven, Rein Halbersma, 
Katalin Katona and Victoria Shestalova 
The responsibility for the contents of this CPB Discussion Paper remains with the author(s) 
  
  2 
 
CPB Netherlands Bureau for Economic Policy Analysis 
Van Stolkweg 14 
P.O. Box 80510 
2508 GM The Hague, the Netherlands 
 
Telephone  +31 70 338 33 80 
Telefax  +31 70 338 33 50 






ISBN  978-90-5833-500-5  
  3 
Abstract in English 
We examine vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in health-care markets where 
insurers and hospitals bilaterally bargain over contracts. We employ a bargaining model in a 
concentrated health-care market of two hospitals and two health insurers competing on 
premiums. Without vertical integration, some bilateral contracts will not be concluded only if 
hospitals are sufficiently differentiated, whereas with vertical integration we find that a 
breakdown of a contract will always occur. There may be two reasons for not concluding a 
contract. First, hospitals may choose to soften competition by contracting only one insurer in 
the market. Second, insurers and hospitals may choose to increase product differentiation by 
contracting asymmetric hospital networks. Both types raise total industry profits and lower 
consumer welfare. 
 
Key words: insurer-provider networks, managed care, vertical integration, exclusive contracts 
JEL code: G22, G34, I11, L14, L42 
 
Abstract in Dutch 
Wij onderzoeken effecten van verticale fusies en exclusieve contracten in de zorg waarbij 
verzekeraars en ziekenhuizen bilateraal onderhandelen over contracten. In het theoretische 
model onderhandelen twee ziekenhuizen met twee verzekeraars, waarbij verzekeraars via hun 
premiestelling concurreren om consumenten. In een model zonder verticale fusies vinden we 
dat sommige partijen geen contracten afsluiten wanneer de verschillen tussen de twee 
ziekenhuizen groot zijn. In een model met verticale integratie komt dit echter altijd voor. De 
contracten worden niet afgesloten om twee redenen. Ten eerste kan het voor beide ziekenhuizen 
aantrekkelijker zijn om een contract af te sluiten met een en dezelfde verzekeraar. Ten tweede 
kunnen ziekenhuizen en verzekeraars een grotere differentiatie op de verzekeringsmarkt creëren 
door de ziekenhuisnetwerken van elkaar te onderscheiden. In beide gevallen gaan de totale 
industriewinsten omhoog en gaat de consumentenwelvaart omlaag. 
Steekwoorden: gezondheidszorg, verticale fusies, exclusieve contracten, onderhandelingstheorie 
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Abstract
We examine vertical integration and exclusive vertical restraints in
healthcare markets where insurers and hospitals bilaterally bargain over
contracts. We employ a bargaining model in a concentrated health care
market of two hospitals and two health insurers competing on premiums.
Without vertical integration, some bilateral contracts will not be con-
cluded only if hospitals are suﬃciently diﬀerentiated, whereas with verti-
cal integration we ﬁnd that a breakdown of a contract will always occur.
There may be two reasons for not concluding a contract. First, hospitals
may choose to soften competition by contracting only one insurer in the
market. Second, insurers and hospitals may choose to increase product
diﬀerentiation by contracting asymmetric hospital networks. Both types
raise total industry proﬁts and lower consumer welfare.
JEL Classiﬁcation Numbers: G22, G34, I11, L14, L42
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11 Introduction
One of the main challenges in health care is to reduce costs by providing health
care more eﬃciently. In the US, and recently also in Europe, market oriented
approach has been followed, in which competing health insurers and health care
providers should achieve an eﬃcient allocation of production and consumption
of health care. This approach may stimulate the appearance of new forms of in-
stitutional and contractual arrangements in the health care sector. For example,
the growth of managed care in the US has led to tighter vertical arrangements
between health insurers and providers in the form of health maintenance orga-
nizations (HMO). In these organizations insurers’ enrollees typically receive full
reimbursement for services from providers within the network, and may face
co-payments when visiting providers outside the network. Vertical restraints
or integration can be a tool for insurers and providers to gain eﬃciency but
they may also have anticompetitive eﬀects. The question about potential con-
sequences of vertical integration between an insurer and a hospital is currently
becoming important in Europe. For instance, this question has been discussed
by the Dutch Parliament and the current government in the Netherlands now
plans a per se prohibition of vertical integration between an insurer and a hos-
pital.1
In this paper, we examine under what market conditions vertical restraints
harm competition and what type of restraints are harmful. We study this ques-
tion with a theoretical bilateral-duopoly model of a competitive health care
market in which insurers and hospitals bilaterally bargain over contracts.2 Our
model draws from Gal-Or (1997) and features Hotelling competition in both the
hospital and insurer market, with a ﬁxed demand for health care. To test the
impact of vertical restraints we deviate from the bargaining concept used in Gal-
Or but use a more advanced bargaining concept, that was recently developed
by de Fontenay and Gans (2005). Their bargaining concept has two advantages.
First, while Gal-Or (1997) considers (ineﬃcient) linear contracts between hospi-
tals and insurers, their concept considers non-linear contracts and assumes that
bargaining takes place eﬃciently. Second, it allows for more diﬀerent types of
vertical relationships, such as vertical integration.
The paper proceeds as follows. We describe the literature and our contri-
bution to it in section 2. We develop our model in section 3, which we use in
section 4 to analyze the eﬀects of diﬀerent types of exclusive vertical contracts
and vertical integration on the market outcome. In particular, in section 4.1, we
start with the benchmark case of no vertical restraints or integration between
insurers and hospitals; and in sections 4.2 we consider exclusive contracts, and
in section 4.3 we analyze the eﬀect of vertical integration. Section 5 provides the
consumer welfare analysis. In the last section, we draw conclusions and outline
directions for further research. We relegate more technical details concerning
the justiﬁcation of the bargaining approach used to the appendix.
1Source: The coalition aggreement of the Duch government of September 30, 2010
(http://www.rijksoverheid.nl/regering/het-kabinet/regeerakkoord).
2In the sequel of the paper we will use the term hospitals, since we primarily focus on this
subject, but a more general term, such as health care providers, would be appropriate as well.
22 Literature and contribution
Managed care organizations use various forms of vertical arrangements to reduce
the cost of providing health care and improve the quality of care. There is
evidence that a vertically integrated network may enhance consumer welfare
by providing health care more eﬃciently. Many studies on the US have shown
that insurance provided by managed care organizations cost 10 to 20 percent
less than indemnity insurance. Whether these cost reductions are all eﬃciency
savings is however still unclear; some of these cost reductions may also be related
to lower quality of care or selection of low risk enrollees (Getzen, 2007). There
is also a welfare loss associated with vertically integrated networks. On the
demand side, two recent empirical papers of Capps et al. (2003) and Ho (2006)
report welfare losses from a restriction in provider choice. On the supply side,
welfare losses are associated with strategic behavior of insurers and providers.
Gaynor and Vogt (2000) provide an overview.
The anticompetitive eﬀects of horizontal mergers are well-known, but the
literature on vertical restraints is less developed. Bijlsma et al. (2008) present
an overview and argue that vertical relationships may result in anticompeti-
tive foreclosure of competitors, but only in the presence of market power in
the insurance and/or hospital market. Recently, Ho (2009) provides empirical
evidence that in the US, market power of hospitals is sometimes responsible for
vertical restraints in the market. Some hospitals may demand high prices that
not all insurers are willing to pay. In Europe, these issues play a role in countries
with market oriented approaches to health care, such as the Netherlands and
Switzerland. In the Netherlands, there was a debate on a per se prohibition of
vertical mergers between hospitals and health insurers. The ﬁnal report by an
independent commission concluded that a ban on vertical integration was not
necessary and that antitrust policy should assess intended vertical mergers case
by case (Baarsma et al., 2009). A related subject in health care concerns the
welfare eﬀects of vertical arrangements within the health care provision chain,
for example, between physicians and hospitals. Also here the empirical litera-
ture is mixed. For example, Cuellar and Gertler (2006) ﬁnd that in many US
markets where managed care grew rapidly, hospital and physician integrated to
increase their market power and hospital pricing. Ciliberto and Dranove (2006)
ﬁnd however no evidence in California that vertical activity of hospitals and
physicians led to signiﬁcant changes in hospital prices.
There are a few theoretical papers in the health economics literature that
study exclusive contracting and vertical integration between insurers and hos-
pitals in a duopoly setting. Important contributions are papers by Gaynor and
Ma (1996), Ma (1997) and Gal-Or (1997, 1999). Gaynor and Ma (1996) study
exclusive dealing in a model of two homogeneous insurers and two diﬀerenti-
ated hospitals. They assume a situation where insurers can grant an exclusive
contract to a single hospital to treat all its enrollees. Gaynor and Ma ﬁnd that
neither insurers nor hospitals have individual incentives for this type of exclu-
sive dealing. If such customer foreclosure of the non-contracted hospital would
have occurred, however, the reduced choice would be detrimental to consumer
surplus.
Gal-Or (1997) studies a bargaining model of two insurers and two hospi-
tals. Both insurers and hospitals are diﬀerentiated along Hotelling lines. On
the downstream market, two insurers simultaneously choose the hospital net-
3works that they contract, as well as the premiums for the associated insurance
policies. For each pair of insurer strategies in the downstream market, the in-
surers’ proﬁts are determined through simultaneous bilateral Nash bargaining
between the various hospital-insurer pairs. Even though hospitals and insur-
ers are treated symmetrically in each bargaining sub-game, only insurers are
strategic players that can optimize between the various bargaining subgames.
Hospitals, in contrast, take the insurers’ choice of the network and premium
as given. Gal-Or ﬁnds that selective contracting can arise in equilibrium. In
particular, foreclosure of a hospital is proﬁtable in a small range of parameters
where hospital diﬀerentiation is much smaller than insurer diﬀerentiation. In
this exclusionary outcome, consumers are better oﬀ because insurers obtain a
more favorable price from oﬀering exclusivity to one hospital and partly transfer
these gains to consumers. In a subsequent paper, Gal-Or (1999) extends her
model to arbitrary numbers of hospitals and insurers located on Salop circles,
largely conﬁrming the results of the bilateral duopoly case.
Similar market behavior as generated by exclusive contracts, can also occur
through vertical integration. Ma (1997) analyzes vertical integration in a model
of two homogeneous insurers and two diﬀerentiated hospitals similar to the one
of Gaynor and Ma (1996). He demonstrates that a vertical merger can result
in the competing insurer being foreclosed from upstream inputs. Such input
foreclosure can subsequently lead to downstream monopolization, in which case
Ma (1997) shows that the eﬀect on consumer welfare is ambiguous. Apart from
this paper by Ma (1997) the theoretical health economics literature, to the
best of our knowledge, focuses on upstream exclusion, in which the insurer is
prevented from contracting other hospitals, but in which hospitals can still serve
all insurers. We are not aware of any theoretical papers discussing exclusion of
an insurer or mutually exclusive arrangements such as the Kaiser-Permanente
system.
Since our interest lies in a model that will be applicable to situations with
ﬁxed total demand for health insurance, such as under mandatory insurance, we
will use the model setup by Gal-Or as starting point. This set-up features a ﬁxed
population, distributed on Hotelling line. Mandatory insurance, in combination
with a large basic beneﬁt package, is applied in many European countries.3 In
the U.S. there is still a lot of uninsurance, but the proposed health reform by
the Obama government is intended to provide insurance to those who currently
do not have it.4
We contribute to the literature by applying a more advanced bargaining
concept than in Gal-Or (1997). This bargaining concept was recently developed
by de Fontenay and Gans (2005, 2007). It treats both insurers and hospitals
as strategic players and is suitable for modelling of non-cooperative bargaining
among multiple parties. It does not impose the restriction of linear contracts
3A model with these features is applied in many European countries, for example, in
Germany, Switzerland and the Netherlands. Also in the US, the Medicare HMO plans for
citizens over 65 years of age form an example of such a system. In health economics terms,
this type of arrangements represent a model of managed competition with community rated
premiums, open enrolment, and a risk-adjustment system.
4Recently two papers appeared that study vertical restraints in a voluntary insurance
setting. In Bijlsma et al. (2009) exclusive contracting of hospitals by insurers raises the
costs of self-insurance by consumers. In Halbersma en Katona (2010) the total demand for
treatments in hospitals is not ﬁxed. Higher prices in their model raises the number of non-
insured individuals and lowers hospital demand.
4between insurers and hospitals and results in a unique Bayesian-Nash equilib-
rium. However, we deviate slightly from the original concept of de Fontenay
and Gans (2005, 2007) in the sense that in our model the downstream ﬁrms (in-
surers) do not compete on quantities à la Cournot, but they compete in prices
on a Hotelling line. Apart from the bargaining phase, our model set-up (spec-
iﬁcation of consumer preferences and hospital costs) otherwise closely follows
Gal-Or (1997). Note also that her model does not incorporate moral hazard or
selection eﬀects. Moral hazard and selection eﬀects are prominent in any health
care market. Relaxing one of the above assumptions would make our model
richer, but also more complex. The incentive structure in our model combines
the approaches of Gal-Or (1997) and Ma (1997) since we analyze both individual
and joint incentives for exclusive behavior.
By using a more comprehensive bargaining concept and incentive structure,
the outcome of our model turns out to be more in line with Ma (1997) than with
Gal-Or (1997). In our symmetric health care market model with ﬁxed consumer
demand, both health insurers and hospitals can increase their industry proﬁts
by foreclosing a competitor. They can improve their market power by vertical
integration or by restricting rivals’ networks through exclusive contracts. In
our model foreclosure of an insurer appears to be a more proﬁtable exclusive
strategy than foreclosure of a hospital.
3 Model and the bargaining game
The set-up of our model of the health care market is similar to that considered
by Gal-Or (1997). For the bargaining game, we follow de Fontenay and Gans
(2005, 2007), who designed a bilateral bargaining framework that is speciﬁcally
suitable for situations with externalities. In our setup there are various types
of externalities. There are externalities resulting from horizontal competition
between insurers and hospitals, and from network membership. In this section
we describe the model and deﬁne the bargaining outcome for the case without
vertical restraints or vertical integration.
3.1 General set up
In our model, two health insurers and two hospitals serve a certain population.
We assume that each health insurer and each hospital negotiate bilaterally about
the amount that the insurer will pay to the hospital for providing health care
to its insurees. If the negotiation succeeds, the hospital joins the insurer’s net-
work. After the networks are established, the insurers compete for individuals
by setting a uniform insurance premium for health insurance that fully covers
the care from the respective network.5
We designate the insurers by I1 and I2 and assume them to be located at
the end points of a Hotelling line of unit length. The population is distributed
uniformly on the line between the two insurers with transportation cost para-
meter M reﬂecting the degree of diﬀerentiation between insurers. Consumers
know their location y ∈ [0,1] at the downstream Hotelling line before buying
5Hence, we assume that the individuals do not pay any copayments for receiving care.
However, including copayments will not change the results.
5insurance. The reason why we assume the insurers to be horizontally diﬀeren-
tiated ex ante is as follows. Consumers often obtain care through the collective
contracts of their employers, and employers may prefer one insurer over the
other as the result of additional services oﬀered by that insurer, or as a result
of switching costs. In addition, individuals’ perceived switching costs, such as
status quo bias, may lead to horizontal diﬀerentiation of insurers. The presence
of horizontal diﬀerentiation is consistent with the low cross-price elasticities of
demand for health insurance reported by many studies (e.g. Douven et al., 2007;
Strombom et al., 2002).
After buying insurance, a consumer falls ill with ﬁxed probability θ (0 < θ <
1) and learns his illness. In the upstream market, two hospitals, HA and HB,
oﬀer medical services. To ease the exposition, we consider a symmetric case
in which both hospitals have zero ﬁxed costs and constant marginal costs, and
hence the same average treatment cost cA = cB = c.6 Although both hospitals
are able to treat all types of diseases, they are diﬀerentiated in their eﬀectiveness
for treating diﬀerent diseases. We model the diﬀerentiation between hospitals
by using a Hotelling model. The hospitals are located at the end points of the
upstream Hotelling line of unit length. The patients are uniformly distributed
between them with the transportation cost parameter t, which reﬂects the de-
gree of ex-post diﬀerentiation between hospitals. The transportation parameter
t is larger, when there are large diﬀerences between hospitals in their eﬀective-
ness for treating diﬀerent diseases. The location of a patient on the upstream
Hotelling line is denoted by x ∈ [0,1]. While the downstream location y is known
ex-ante, already at the moment of buying health insurance, the upstream loca-
tion x is revealed only later, after the consumer has become ill. Therefore, the
product that consumers buy is essentially a bundle of options for access to the
various services of the two hospitals that are contracted by the insurer (Capps
et al., 2003).
Both transportation parameters, M and t, are considered ﬁxed in the short
run, during which contracts are concluded and service delivery takes place. How-
ever, they can change in the long run. For example, in the long run, hospitals
can extend or narrow their specialization, insurers can adjust their policies, etc.
The two hospitals and the two insurers bargain bilaterally over contracts.
In the case of a successful negotiation, the hospital enters insurer Ii’s network,
Gi ⊆ {HA,HB}. The two networks can overlap with each other. Individuals
who buy insurance from insurer Ii have access only to hospitals that are in
the network Gi. Both insurers engage in price competition in the downstream
market by setting insurance premiums Fi for consumers to access the respective
insurance network Gi. If Gi = ∅, then insurer Ii has no contracts and the
consumers buy their health insurance from the other health insurer. We assume
that in the latter case, the remaining insurer cannot set monopoly prices, but
a regulator will cap the premium to a maximum of F that guarantees a certain
minimum expected utility level to consumers. We assume the regulation to be
light-handed in the sense that the regulated monopoly premium cannot be less
than the equilibrium premium in the case of insurance duopoly (which will be
derived in section 3.4). The assumption that the monopoly premiums will be
regulated at an aﬀordable level is realistic and ensures that our model is still
applicable for the analysis of the markets with mandatory insurance, in which
6The model can be also generalized for assymmetric costs.
6the complete population needs to be covered by health insurance.
3.2 Consumer preferences
We specify consumer preferences by the same consumer indirect utility func-
tion as in Gal-Or (1997). The individual ex-ante expected utility depends on
the insurance premium, the hospital network to which the individual will have
access, and consumer location y at the Hotelling line between the two insurers.
In particular, a consumer who buys health insurance from insurer Ii (oﬀering
access to network Gi at price Fi) derive an ex-ante expected utility of:
Ui = θ(υ − T(Gi)) − (Fi + Myi). (1)
The ﬁrst term represents the ex-ante expected indirect utility from the treatment
in one of the hospitals from the insurer’s network. Here v is a ﬁxed parameter
that reﬂects the utility from being treated, and T(Gi) reﬂects the expected
transportation cost to the hospital. We discuss the term T(Gi) in more detail
below. The last term reﬂects the insurance premium Fi and the transportation
cost Myi between the consumer and insurer Ii, where y1 = y and y2 = 1 − y.
As explained, the individual falls ill with ﬁxed probability θ, after which he
learns his location x on the Hotelling line between the two hospitals. There-
fore, the individual’s ex-post transportation costs to hospitals HA and HB are
expressed as tx and t(1 − x) respectively. If network Gi includes both hospi-
tals, then the individual will select the one which is closer to his location x (i.e.
hospital HA if x ∈ [0, 1
2] and HB if x ∈ [1
2,1]), whereas if network Gi consists
of only one hospital, there is no choice and the individual goes to that hospi-

























We assume that v is a ﬁxed value and that it is large enough, so that the ex-ante
expected utility in equilibrium will be always positive. Our model is now totally
determined by the exogenous parameters M, t, θ, c, and F.
3.3 Total industry proﬁts
In this section we consider all potential alternative conﬁgurations of insurer-
hospital contractual relationships that may arise in this industry and derive
total industry proﬁts for each conﬁguration. Since each insurer’s network may
include none, one, or both hospitals, there are ﬁfteen diﬀerent (not empty)
conﬁgurations possible, shown in Appendix 1. Six conﬁgurations correspond
to an insurer monopoly in which one insurer is out of business and the other
insurer contracts one or two hospitals. Nine networks represent the duopoly
7case, where both insurers contract either one or two hospitals. Due to symmetry,
some of these networks result in the same total proﬁts. Hence, there are only six
diﬀerent conﬁgurations to consider; they correspond to diﬀerent rows in Table
5 from Appendix 1.
We start with the insurer duopoly case, in which insurer I1 contracts network
G1 and insurer I2 contracts network G2. In a Hotelling setup insurer Ii’s demand
is determined by the marginal consumer who is indiﬀerent between the two











Here the labeling −i denotes the other insurer. The expression is symmetric for
both insurers. Insurers can increase demand by lowering their premium F or
by increasing transportation cost to their network T(G). We assume eﬃcient
bargaining (this assumption will be discussed in section 3.5), which means that
the insurers pay hospitals two-part tariﬀs with the variable part equal to the
marginal cost, so that the proﬁt maximizing insurers set premiums to maximize
their revenue minus production cost. Since the marginal costs of both hospitals







A straightforward calculation yields that in any fully symmetric duopoly con-
ﬁguration, the premiums are M + θc and the total industry proﬁts are M.
The intuition behind this result is that in a symmetric case the indiﬀerent con-
sumer on the insurance market is located in the middle of the Hotelling line
and total industry proﬁts are equal to the transportation cost M, as in the
standard Hotelling model (Tirole, 1998). For an asymmetric duopoly networks,
in which one insurer has a contract with one hospital and the other one with
two hospitals, our model generates the respective insurers’ premiums θc+M− θt
12
and θc+M+ θt
12. The total proﬁts equal M +
(θt/12)2
M . Since the insurer that
contracts both hospitals becomes more attractive for consumers the indiﬀerent
consumer on the insurance market is now located closer to the insurer with a
smaller network. As a result the insurer that contracts both hospitals is able to
charge a higher premium and this results in higher total industry proﬁts. The
additional proﬁts relate positively to the degree of hospital diﬀerentiation, t (as
compared to the degree of insurer diﬀerentiation M), and to the probability of
contracting illness, θ.
Next, we consider insurer monopoly conﬁgurations. With only one insurer
being present in the market, say insurer Ii, the demand function and the optimal
7The model can be generalized to the case of asymmetric costs. For a given net-
work state, hospital Hj’s demand qij from the insured by insurer Ii equals qij =
θqi(Fi,F−i|Gi,G−i)sj(Gi), where sj(Gi) is the expected share of consumers at hospi-
tal Hj from insurer Ii. and the condition on optimal insurance premiums F∗
i becomes
F∗




8premium are the following:
qi(Fi|Gi) =







As explained in section 2.1, to avoid the possibility that the health insurer
monopoly rations demand, we assume that in this case, a regulator caps the
premium level. Therefore, the regulated monopoly premiums for one- and two-
hospital networks are F, and the corresponding proﬁts are Π = F − θc. The
regulation is light-handed in the sense that the regulated premium cannot be
less than the minimum premium earned in a duopoly setting, i.e., Π ≥ M. The
latter assumption agrees with the general insight from industrial organization
models that prices are lower in less concentrated markets. Note that for the sake
of simplicity we assume that the total industry proﬁts in the insurer monopoly
case do not depend on the number of hospitals in the insurer’s network. This
assumption matches with the symmetric duopoly cases, in which less hospital
choice does not inﬂuence total industry proﬁts either. However, our results
will still hold if we assume that the regulatory cap depends on the number of
hospitals contracted by the insurer.
3.4 Timing
When modelling the bargaining process and the outcome, we use the insight of
de Fontenay and Gans (2005, 2007). The timeline of the game consists of three
stages.
• Stage 0: Ownership of assets and the set of all potential contractual
relations among four players are determined. We consider only vertical
contractual relations, in the sense that insurers buy services produced by
hospitals (and not services produced by the other insurers, also hospitals
do not buy services of other hospitals). The distribution of ownership
rights is assumed to be exogenous. In the remainder of this section and
in sections 4.1 and 4.2, we assume that health insurers and hospitals are
separately owned by their respective asset managers. In section 4.3 that
focuses on vertical integration between an insurer and a hospital, the own-
ership rights will be allocated to one of the two parties.
• Stage 1: Bargaining takes place; the equilibrium network and payoﬀ
allocation are established. We discuss this stage in more detail in the next
subsection.
• Stage 2: Insurers set premiums and oﬀer insurance to consumers. Con-
sumers choose an insurer. After this they may get ill with probability θ
and then choose the closest hospital from their insurer’s hospital network,
and receive treatment. The insurers transfer the respective payments to
the hospitals.
3.5 Bargaining and payoﬀ allocation
Several recent studies have applied cooperative game theory concepts to deter-
mine the payoﬀ allocation among players in the context of bilateral bargaining.
9Most of these studies adopt axiomatic approach to derive the equilibrium pay-
oﬀs in the form of Shapley value (Stole and Zwiebel, 1996, and Inderst and
Wey, 2003). Gans and Fontenay (2005, 2007) have shown that Shapley-value
outcomes can also be derived based on the explicit extensive form game among
players. Furthermore, they extended the model to the case with externalities in
the downstream market and proved that in this case, the payoﬀ allocation takes
the form of the generalized Myerson-Shapley value. The generalized Myerson-
Shapley value extends the concept of Shapley value to games in which the value
of a coalition depends on action of other players. In other words, while the
Shapley value reﬂects the average marginal contribution of the player to vari-
ous coalitions which do not impose externalities on each other, the generalized
Myerson-Shapley value extends this concept to games in which the coalition
value may depend on the partition of players into coalitions. Similarly to the
Shapley value, the generalized Myerson-Shapley value can be justiﬁed on ax-
iomatic grounds, as well as can be obtained from an extensive form game. Not
to complicate the exposition with the detailed description of the extensive form
bargaining game, we choose here for axiomatic approach and relegate the ex-
tensive form game and all formal assumptions supporting it to Appendix 2.
Following axiomatic approach, we impose the requirement that the individ-
ual payoﬀs resulting from the bargaining satisfy the axioms of eﬃciency and
fairness (which can be derived from the game described in Appendix 2). Here
eﬃciency means that the intermediate tariﬀs are set eﬃciently to maximize the
joint surplus of the two players. To meet this requirement, we assume two-part
tariﬀs in which the variable part is set equal to marginal cost of production c.8
In such a case the insurers will internalize the production cost when choosing
their optimal policies. Therefore, the total industry proﬁts on each conﬁgura-
tion are equal to those computed in the previous section. Fairness means that
the net surplus derived from each bilateral relationship is split equally between
the two players. Since the relationship is only feasible when it is proﬁtable, the
contract can only be concluded if it generates a non-negative net surplus. We
analyze this feasibility condition in more detail in the next section.
The application of these axioms leads to the system of bargaining equations,
which we solve iteratively to obtain the individual payoﬀs in each conﬁguration.
The resulting payoﬀ allocation is equivalent to the generalized Myerson-Shapley
value (since this value represents the unique allocation satisfying our axioms,
according to Myerson (1977a,b)). We start with the simplest conﬁgurations
(no contracts and every players yields a zero payoﬀ), after which we consider
conﬁgurations with only one contract, using the previous conﬁguration as the
outside option. We continue in this way, until we reach the most complete con-
ﬁguration of four contracts. Table 1 summarizes the results of this procedure in
the case of symmetric production costs and consumer preferences. As explained
above, the assumption of symmetry implies that we need to consider only six
diﬀerent conﬁgurations. The ﬁrst column of the table shows all the diﬀerent
8This is the same as to assume a two-part tariﬀ with a regulated per-unit price set at the
level of marginal costs. Without this restriction, the bilateral insurer-hospital proﬁt maxi-
mization is ill-deﬁned for the case of symmetric insurer duopoly with two hospitals, as the
total demand for each hospital is ﬁxed in this case and cannot be aﬀected by the insurer pay-
ment to the hospital. A regulatory constraint that sets the variable part of the two-part tariﬀ
equal to marginal costs eliminates double marginalization and generates bilateral eﬃciency.
This simpliﬁcation is reasonable as long as we focus on the eﬀect of vertical relations on proﬁt
division between ﬁrms rather than on the actual size of the industry proﬁts.
10conﬁgurations possible. The second column shows the respective total industry
proﬁts. These proﬁts were computed in section 2.4. They depend on the in-
dustry conﬁguration, and can take three values: Π, M, and M + ∆M, where
∆M =
(θt/12)2
M . The third column presents the resulting individual payoﬀs, Φi,
computed by solving the bargaining equations iteratively.
Several general results follow from the outcomes in Table 1:
• A hospital or an insurer with more links in a given network yield higher
proﬁts, since establishing more links improves the bargaining position of
the ﬁrm by improving its outside option.
• Only in an insurer duopoly with an asymmetric network, the hospital
diﬀerentiation parameter t enters the proﬁt expression. The reason is that
in symmetric networks hospital choice by a consumer is independent of its
insurer choice.
• In an insurer duopoly with two hospitals in both insurers’ networks, an
increase in Π increases hospital proﬁts but decreases insurer proﬁts. The
reason is that the outside option of eliminating one insurer becomes more
attractive for hospitals.
• In an insurer duopoly with an asymmetric hospital networks, the addi-
tional proﬁt ∆M arises because of the increased diﬀerentiation of insurer
policies, because the indiﬀerent consumer on the insurance market is not
located in the middle of the Hotelling line. The bargaining game allocates
the additional proﬁts ∆M =
(θt/12)2
M equally among the four players. Im-
portant is the notion that total and individual proﬁts increase if consumers
perceive more diﬀerences between hospitals and less diﬀerences between
insurers.
11Table 1. Network conﬁguration, total industry proﬁts, and indi-
vidual payoﬀs in the non-integrated case
Network conﬁguration Total proﬁt   v Individual payoﬀs
HA
I1
















































124 Incentive for exclusion
In this section, we formulate the conditions under which the complete industry
conﬁguration can arise, in which both hospitals deliver health care to clients
of both insurers; and the conditions under which less than four contracts are
concluded in equilibrium. In the latter case some ﬁrm may exit from the market.
The analysis is done for three diﬀerent allocations of ownership rights, which
are speciﬁed in stage 0 of the game. We start with the case, in which each ﬁrm
is owned by its asset manager and there are no vertical restraints in contracts
(section 4.1). In section 4.2, we assume that one insurer-hospital pair engages
in an exclusive contract. Finally, in section 4.3, we consider the case of vertical
integration between an insurer and a hospital. The vertical arrangements are
modelled according to the approach of de Fontenay and Gans (2005) and de
Fontenay et al. (2009), which allows us to distinguish diﬀerent types of exclusive
contracts and vertical integration. We will argue that mainly the exclusion of an
insurer from contracting some hospital(s) is a concern in this market and that
certain types of exclusive contracts and vertical integration make this exclusion
more likely.
4.1 Benchmark: no integration and no vertical restraints
Suppose that each ﬁrm is owned by its asset manager and there are no vertical
restraints. The payoﬀ allocations for this case are shown in Table 1. The com-
plete industry conﬁguration (the last row in Table 1) is feasible, if and only if
each ﬁrm beneﬁts from signing each contract under each possible subconﬁgura-
tion. Denote the complete conﬁguration by G, and any part of this conﬁguration
by K ⊆ G. Then the feasibility condition means that for all K, any two ﬁrms i
and j that have a relationship in K should beneﬁt from this relationship:
Φi(K) ≥ Φi(K\(ij)) and Φj(K) ≥ Φj(K\(ij)), where K ⊆ G, (ij) ∈ K. (2)
For example, let us check these conditions for K = G. From symmetry, it
is suﬃcient to check the condition for one link, say link between HB and I2.
Moreover, since the two ﬁrms share the net surplus equally, it is suﬃcient to
check for one ﬁrm only, say for hospital HB. Link (HBI2) is only proﬁtable for
hospital HB if ΦB(G) ≥ ΦB(G\(HBI2)). Based on Table 1, this is equivalent
to 1
12(M + 2Π) ≥ 1
12(3∆M + 2Π), which reduces to M ≥ 3∆M. Applying this
procedure for all subgraphs and links yields the complete set of the feasibility
conditions for graph G.
Proposition 1 As long as conditions (3)-(4) hold, the bargaining game results
is a unique equilibrium in which both insurers contract with both hospitals.






A violation of the ﬁrst condition leads to elimination of one insurer in equi-
librium. If the ﬁrst condition holds, while the second condition is violated, the
number of contractual relationships decreases by one.
13The proof of Proposition 1 follows directly after eliminating the overlapping
feasibility conditions and ﬁlling in the value ∆M = 3
(θt/12)2
M . If one of these
conditions is not satisﬁed then at least one player has no incentive to enter a
contract. This may result in less than four contracts and some players may be
even excluded from the market. This may occur for two reasons.
First, if feasibility condition (3) is violated, it is individually rational for
hospitals to contract with a single insurer and to eliminate the other insurer
from the market. This is because in such a case hospital’s loss from weakening
its outside options is compensated through the gains from the increased total in-
dustry proﬁt when the insurance market becomes monopoly instead of duopoly.
The exclusion occurs when monopoly proﬁts Π = F − θc are at least twice as
high as duopoly proﬁts M.
Second, if only condition (4) is violated, then after three contractual relations
have been established, it is not proﬁtable anymore for the remaining two players
to establish the last one. This results in a three-link conﬁguration, in which one
insurer contracts both hospitals and the other insurer contracts one hospital.
On the insurer market, the indiﬀerent consumer is no longer located in the
middle of the Hotelling line but closer to the insurer which contracts only one
hospital. The insurer with two hospitals exploits the fact that the consumers
value choice, and raises the insurance premium. This generates extra industry
proﬁts that are allocated among all the players in such a way that the proﬁts
for the hospital and insurer with one contract are higher than they would be
with an additional contract. Thus, the fourth relationship does not arise. Note
that each of the four possible three-link networks is equally likely to occur due
to our symmetry assumption. All the four ﬁrms are still active in the market in
this case.
The outcome that one hospital is fully excluded never occurs in equilibrium
in our model. Each insurer has as incentive to deviate from such an outcome,
because contracting more hospitals increases its proﬁt by improving its bargain-
ing position vis-a-vis each hospital. This is an important insight that contrasts
with the result of Gal-Or (1997). She considers a similar model, but a diﬀerent
(ineﬃcient) bargaining procedure featuring linear contracts between hospitals
and insurers. In her model, if θt
M is suﬃciently small, both insurers have an
incentive to contract one hospital and exclude the other one from the market,
because "if a payer chooses to exclude one of the hospitals from its approved
list, its bargaining position vis-a-vis the remaining hospital is improved, since
this hospital may be willing to accept lower reimbursement rates in return for
a larger volume of patients that such an exclusion guarantees" (Gal-Or, 1997,
p.6.). However, since in our case the bargaining is eﬃcient, the bargaining po-
sition of an insurer always deteriorates when a hospital is excluded from its
network.
4.2 Exclusive contract
Any restriction or clause that is imposed by one member of the vertical rela-
tionship on the other member is called a vertical restraint. In this section we
consider the eﬀect of exclusive clauses in contracts between insurers and hospi-
tals. These clauses restrict one or both parties from having a relationship with
some of the other market participants, which aﬀects the bargaining outcome.
Similarly to de Fontenay et al. (2009), we model this restriction as exogenously
14given in stage 0, but we assume that the exclusive clause is not renegotiable
during the bargaining game in stage 1.9 We distinguish three types of exclusive
contracts between insurer I1 and hospital HA, referred to as E1, E2 and E3
respectively. First, an exclusive clause between insurer I1 and hospital HA can
restrict the hospital HA in its ability to sell its output to insurer I2. Second, it
can restrict insurer I1 in its ability to buy from hospital HB. Third, it can be
mutual: both parties signing the contract agree to refrain from having contracts
with other parties. Table 2 shows how the network conﬁguration changes in the
presence of such clauses between HA and I1. Since in our context, exclusive
clauses simply restrict the network conﬁguration, the total industry proﬁts   v
and the payoﬀ allocations can be easily derived from Table 1. In particular, the
total industry proﬁts under E1, E2 and E3 are the same as in the respective
restricted networks shown in Table 1:
  vE1 =   vE2 = M + ∆M,
  vE3 = M.
The three restricted graphs are shown in Table 3. These graphs are feasible as
long as condition (3) of section 4.1 holds. The resulting payoﬀ allocations are
shown in Table 2, where we report the joint payoﬀ of HA and I1 and individual
payoﬀs of the other players. The insurer-hospital pair HAI1 has incentive to
engage into an exclusive relationship if the joint proﬁts of the insurer-hospital
pair with the exclusivity clause are larger than without the exclusive clause.
Although in such a case the exclusive contract may still decrease the individual
bargaining outcome for one of these market players, the gains of the other player
are suﬃcient to compensate for this loss.10
9De Fontenay et al. (2009) models exclusive contracts as allocation of residual rights.
They assume that exclusivity clauses can be renegotiated in the bargaining stage, therefore,
an exclusivity clause has merely impact on the division of surplus among players. It shifts
the surplus towards the player who is the residual claimant of exclusivity rights. Diﬀerently
from De Fontenay et al. (2009), our analysis focuses on the circumstances under which an
exclusive clause is not renegotiable, resulting in an incomplete network conﬁguration (the so-
called ‘naked exclusion’). We also considered the possibility of renegotiation of the exclusive
clause. However, for all three excluse clauses the full graph turned out to be infeasible anyway,
at least for ∆M > 0.
10It is known that characteristic values such as the generalized Myerson-Shapley value are
not fully stable under joint incentives (pairwise, or more generally, coalition-wise) in the
presence of competitive externalities. The core is the cooperative equilibrium concept that is
stable under all individual as well as all group deviations. However, the core is in general not
unique, and we are also not aware of a framework that, even in the presence of competitive
externalities, generates a unique payoﬀ vector within the core.
15Table 2. Payoﬀ allocation with exclusive clauses between HA and
I1
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Therefore, in the further analysis we compare the joint payoﬀ of HA and I1
under the exclusivity clause to their joint payoﬀ without this clause, to see if the
exclusivity clause increases the joint payoﬀ. Furthermore, we check whether the
graph is robust with respect to possible counteractions of the other two players.
• E1: Φ1,E1 + ΦA,E1 = 1
12(4M + 6∆M + 2Π) ≥ M+∆M
2 ≥ M
2 . This means
that as long as ∆M > 0 (and Π ≥ M) there is an incentive for exclusive
clause E1. Note that the insurer I2 and hospital HB are not able to
undertake a counter-action for example by eliminating the link I1HB.
Under E1, hospital HB’s proﬁt becomes ΦB,E1 = 1
12(4M + 3∆M) > M
4 .
So HB is better oﬀ without the link. Insurer I2 could tempt hospital HB to




12(M + 3∆M). However, this is infeasible for insurer I2, because
this would result in a negative payoﬀ for himself: Φ2−τ = 1
6(M −Π) ≤ 0.
• E2: A comparison of the joint proﬁts Φ1+ΦA with and without E2 shows
that E2 is only proﬁtable for the pair if M + 3∆M > Π. Therefore this
contract is proﬁtable under a smaller range of parameters than contract
E1. Furthermore, Φ1,E2 + ΦA,E2 ≤ M+∆M
2 . Therefore, this contract is
also less proﬁtable for the pair than contract E1.
• E3: Φ1,E3 + ΦA,E3 = M
2 . Hence, hospital HA and insurer I1 do not gain
from exclusivity clause E3.
We conclude that there is always incentive for an exclusive contract E1.
This observation yields the following proposition.
Proposition 2 As long as hospital products are not perfect substitutes and reg-
ulated monopoly proﬁts are at least as large as duopoly proﬁts, the most proﬁtable
strategy for an insurer-hospital pair is to adopt an exclusive clause that binds the
hospital not to sell its output to the other insurer. Moreover, the other parties
will not respond to it by signing their own exclusive contract.
Exclusive clause E1 increases the total industry proﬁt as well as the joint
proﬁt of the insurer-hospital pair, thus enabling both players to gain more than
16under the complete graph.11 However, the other insurer is worse oﬀ for two
reasons. First, the product that this insurer sells becomes less valuable to con-
sumers; and second, the bargaining position of this insurer worsens because of
the reduced outside option. The joint proﬁt from the exclusive contract in-
creases, when ∆M =
(θt/12)2
M increases. Thus, both an increase of the hospital
diﬀerentiation parameter t and a decrease in the insurer diﬀerentiation parame-
ter M increase the joint proﬁt made by exclusive clause E1.
4.3 Vertical integration
In this section, we follow the approach proposed by de Fontenay and Gans
(2005) for the analysis of payoﬀ allocation in the case of vertical integration.
They consider two types of integration, forward (FI) and backward integration
(BI). The decision of the two parties to integrate is modeled as exogenous. This
decision is determined in stage 0 and it aﬀects both the allocation of the asset
ownership and the set of potential contractual links. After the set of potential
contractual links has been determined in stage 0, the parties bargain over the
payoﬀ allocation in stage 1.
In the case of forward integration, the hospital takes over the insurer and
becomes the owner of the integrated ﬁrm, while the insurer ﬁrm’s manager
becomes an employee. We focus on integration between hospital HA and insurer
I1. Table 3 (column FI) shows the new conﬁguration of contractual relationships
after hospital HA takes over insurer I1. When HA acquires the ownership rights,
it takes over the premium-setting decision of its insurer I1 and represents this
insurer in negotiations with the other hospital. Insurer I1 receives a transfer
payment from hospital HA for managing the insurance ﬁrm, while all the proﬁts
accrue to HA. This changes the graph, because insurer I1 can no longer negotiate
with hospital HB directly, but it does it via hospital HA. Therefore, they now
need a consent of HA to include hospital HB in the network of insurer I1. When
hospital HA bargains with the insurer I1 or hospital HB, then in the event of
a breakdown in negotiation no arrangements will occur between insurer I1 and
hospital HB. The essential diﬀerence with the benchmark case (section 4.1) is
that under forward integration a breakdown between hospital HA and insurer
I1 has a deeper impact, because after such a breakdown insurer I1 would exit
the market, while without integration insurer I1 would still be able to send its
enrollees to hospital HB.
When backward integration takes place between insurer I1 and hospital HA,
the logic is similar, but the insurer gets all the ownership rights. The graph
changes as shown in Table 3 (column BI) and all the proﬁt of the integrated
ﬁrm accrue to the insurer.
As long as the complete sets of contractual relationships shown in columns
FI and BI are feasible, both insurers are able and willing to buy from both
hospitals. Solving bargaining equations for this case results in payoﬀ allocation
shown in Table 3 below the graphs.
11See Bernheim and Whinston (1998) on the relation between the joint and individual proﬁts
and incentives for exclusive conracts.
17Table 3. Payoﬀs with vertical integration
































Computing the feasibility conditions shows that the complete graph for FI
is only feasible if 2M ≥ Π and 0 ≥ ∆M. The latter constraint implies that
the complete graph is only feasible if there is no diﬀerentiation between hospi-
tals (t = 0). Our interest, however, lies in the case of diﬀerentiated hospitals
(t > 0). In that case, the full graph collapses. The most restrictive feasibility
condition arises for the link HAHB, which implies that the owner of the verti-
cally integrated ﬁrm, hospital HA, breaks the negotiation with hospital HB to
ensure that the enrollees of his insurer I1 will only visit HA. If the vertically
integrated owner HA decides to follow this strategy and does not negotiate with
HB, the graph FI reduces to E2 (see Tables 2-3). Since E2 can increase the
joint payoﬀ of HA and I1 only if M + 3∆M > Π. Therefore, FI can only arise
if this condition holds. FI is accompanied by foreclosure of HB.
A similar result is found for the case of BI. If we compute the feasibility
conditions, we obtain conﬂicting inequalities, implying that the full graph for
BI is never feasible for t > 0 and will collapse into a graph with fewer links.
Various links may be broken depending on the exact parameter conﬁguration.
One can show that, in particular, link I1I2 is not proﬁtable to the owner of
the vertically integrated ﬁrm.12 Without this link its proﬁt is higher than with
this link: 1
12(4M + 3∆M) > 1
12(5M − Π). Breaking the link I1I2 will restrict
the enrollees of insurer I2 to obtain treatments in hospital HA. If the owner
decides to restrict the graph and does not negotiate with I2, the payoﬀ allocation
becomes the same as for exclusive contract E1. This strategy will always increase
the joint payoﬀ of the pair. Similarly to the exclusivity case E1 in section 4.2,
insurer I2 will not be able to undertake a counteraction to restore its weakened
position in the insurance market. Note also that in this case BI is more proﬁtable
than FI.
We conclude that vertical integration creates circumstances under which at
least one pair of ﬁrms does not reach a contractual agreement, leading to an
incomplete graph. In the case of FI, the hospital, as the owner of the vertically
12In particular, suppose that 2M ≥ Π, so that it is feasible to have two insurers. Then
link I1I2 becomes unfeasible if eiher M ≥ 3∆M or M + 3∆M ≥ Π. However, there are also
other links that are infeasible on the BI graph. Detailed computations of all payoﬀs and all
the feasibility conditions on all subgraphs of BI and FI (not included here) are available upon
request.
18integrated ﬁrm, will ensure that the enrollees of his insurer will not visit the
competing hospital. While in the case of BI the insurer, as the owner of the
vertically integrated ﬁrm, will prevent the enrollees of the competing insurer to
obtain access to its own hospital.
Proposition 3 As long as hospital products are not perfect substitutes and regu-
lated monopoly proﬁts are at least as large as duopoly proﬁts, vertical integration
will always result in an incomplete industry conﬁguration. It is always proﬁtable
for the owner of the vertically integrated ﬁrm to break the negotiation with its
competitor. Therefore, forward vertical integration will be accompanied by pre-
venting access of the own enrollees to the competing hospital, while backward
vertical integration will be accompanied by preventing access of the enrollees of
the competing insurer to visit the hospital of the vertically integrated pair.
In section 4.2 and in this section, we considered various types of vertical
arrangements. We have shown that exclusive contracts and vertical integration
can be used by a hospital-insurer pair to increase their proﬁts by eliminating
proﬁtable contracting options for the competing insurer or hospital. In the next
section, we show that these restraints will always reduce consumer welfare they
are not accompanied by gains in production eﬃciency.
5 Consumer welfare
In this section we study how changes in the industry conﬁguration aﬀect con-
sumer welfare. In our model consumer welfare depends on the number of hospi-
tals in each insurer’s network and the premiums paid to the insurers. Therefore,
we need to consider only three diﬀerent cases: all consumers travel to one hos-
pital, one part of the consumers travels to both hospitals while the other part
visits only one hospital, and all consumers can travel to both hospitals. Table
4 provides information about premiums and consumer surplus for these three
conﬁgurations. Note, that the total industry proﬁts depend only on the ﬁnal
industry conﬁguration. For example, it is not important whether a particular
network state arises as a result of an exclusive clause or vertical integration.
In the monopoly case, we have assumed that the regulated premium cap
stays the same irrespectively on the number of hospitals in the insurer’s net-
work. Therefore, when the hospitals are imperfect substitutes, consumer surplus
increases with the inclusion of more hospitals in the network.
In the case of insurer duopoly, consumer welfare is the highest when both
insurers contract both hospitals, since consumers value both lower premiums and
the possibility of hospital choice.13. Therefore, we conclude with the following
proposition.
Proposition 4 As long as regulated monopoly proﬁts are at least as large as
duopoly proﬁts, hospital products are not perfect substitutes, and hospitals do
not diﬀer in cost eﬃciency, exclusive clauses binding a hospital from contracting
another insurer and vertical integration between an insurer and a hospital reduce
consumer welfare.
13More formally, it follows from Table 4 that the consumer surplus for the complete conﬁg-
uration (four contractual relations) exceeds the consumer surplus for an assymmetric network
(three links) if and only if θt/M < 36. However, this must hold, because the state with three
links becomes infeasible only if θt/M < 12.
19Table 4. Welfare analysis































We have shown that insurers and hospitals may ﬁnd it proﬁtable to adopt ver-
tical restraints or integrate vertically to increase their proﬁts but that these
strategies lower consumer welfare. Even if consumer preferences over hospitals
and insurers are symmetric and both hospitals are equally eﬃcient, we ﬁnd that
under some circumstances, insurers and hospitals may choose to contract selec-
tively in order to secure more favorable contractual terms. The ﬁrst exclusive
strategy that follows from our theoretical duopoly model is that hospitals may
choose to exclude some insurer from the market. This strategy will eliminate
competition on the insurer market and raise total industry proﬁts. Removing
one insurer from the market, however, implies a loss of hospitals’ bargaining
power. Therefore, total industry proﬁts must be substantially higher in the
new situation (in our duopoly model, at least twice as high) to compensate the
hospitals for this loss. The second strategy that can be adopted by market play-
ers is an increase of diﬀerentiation on the insurance market by diﬀerentiating
hospital networks of the insurers. We ﬁnd that if hospitals’ diﬀerentiation is
20much larger than insurers’ diﬀerentiation (see the conditions in section 4.1), one
hospital-insurer pair will not enter a contract voluntarily. The idea behind this
mechanism is that the insurer that contracts two hospitals beneﬁts the most
from its premium increase, and he is willing to share these gains with the other
players via bargaining to compensate the hospital-insurer pair that does not
enter a contract.
We show that exclusive clauses and vertical integration improve the oppor-
tunities for using this mechanism. We ﬁnd that the most proﬁtable exclusive
contract of a hospital-insurer pair is a contract that prevents the access of the
competing insurer to their hospital. This raises proﬁts for the hospital-insurer
pair because the competing insurer becomes less attractive for consumers. We
obtain a similar exclusive strategy if the hospital-insurer pair vertically inte-
grates. Another exclusive strategy of a vertically integrated hospital-insurer
pair is to prevent the access of their own enrollees to the competing hospital.
This strategy introduces asymmetry on the insurance market which raises total
industry proﬁts. Furthermore, this strategy reduces the outside option of the
competing hospital, thereby weakening its bargaining power.
Our results provide guidance for the policy debate in countries that are
moving towards a more market-oriented health care market. As the role of
competition increases, these markets tend to reveal more information about
the performance of individual hospitals, especially about the quality diﬀerences
between hospitals. If consumers start to perceive more diﬀerentiation among
hospitals, this could trigger insurers and providers to adopt exclusive strategies
with possible anticompetitive eﬀects. However, provider and insurer compe-
tition also has important eﬃciency eﬀects, which could outweigh the possible
anticompetitive eﬀects of exclusive vertical restraints.
The introduction of more competition in health care also stimulates providers
and insurers to search for new organizational forms. For example, in the US this
has led to the appearance of a variety of managed care organizations, featuring
selective networks, that are based on vertical arrangements such as integration
or exclusive restraints between insurers and providers. Our model suggests that
these exclusionary networks could reduce consumer welfare, unless these disad-
vantages are compensated by the eﬃciencies of integrated health care delivery.
We stress some limitations of our analysis and outline directions for further
research. The analysis in this paper covers a symmetric bilateral-duopoly model
with ﬁxed consumer demand for insurance and health care. In other words, there
is market power both upstream and downstream. As our analysis shows, this
means that any exclusionary equilibrium is (likely to be) anticompetitive.
Our model can be extended to incorporate a consumer demand that is not
ﬁxed (see e.g. Halbersma en Katona (2010)) and asymmetries across both in-
surers and hospitals. Cost diﬀerences across hospitals and potential eﬃciency
gains may be the reason for exclusive relations, providing a positive argument
in favour of these relations (see e.g. Glied (2000)). Furthermore, we do not
consider capacity constraints and vertical quality diﬀerences in the hospital sec-
tor that can also play a role in the bargaining outcome. The model can be also
extended to incorporate these features. The extension of our framework towards
more ﬂexible empirically viable frameworks recently emerging in the empirical
literature (e.g. Capps et al. 2003 and Ho, 2009) would be another possible
direction for further research.
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24Appendix 1
Table 5 shows ﬁfteen possible network conﬁgurations. We distinguish six
monopoly and nine duopoly conﬁgurations. In the symmetric case each row in
Table 5 features the same type of network. These six diﬀerent types of network
conﬁgurations are also listed in Table 1.













































Here we provide technical details justifying our requirements on the payoﬀ
allocation. The bargaining framework is proposed by de Fontenay and Gans
(2007), who consider the following extended form game. Suppose there are N
agents with a set of links L among them (called ‘network’), in which each linked
pair ij is associated with a joint action xij (xij = 0, if the pair is not linked;
the notation x will be used for the vector that contains all joint actions xij).
Each agent has a payoﬀ-function ui(x) −
 
j∈N tij, where the functions ui(x)
are strictly concave utility functions of agents and the transfer payments tij are
equal to zero if the pair ij is not linked.
The agents play a bilateral sequential bargaining game. Only one pair is
involved in bargaining at each time. The extensive form of the game is as follows.
First, the order of negotiating pairs is ﬁxed and becomes a common knowledge.
This order is only needed for technical convenience and does not matter for the
equilibrium outcome. Second, each pair plays a Binmore-Rubinstein-Wolinsky
(1986) bilateral game, in which one ﬁrm makes an oﬀer and the other ﬁrm
either accepts or rejects. When the oﬀer is rejected, the bargaining continues
with probability σ (and now the other ﬁrm makes an oﬀer). Otherwise, with
probability (1−σ), all negotiations end, and the bargaining process recommences
for a network that excludes the link between the two parties who failed to reach
an agreement. The state of the network is common knowledge throughout the
game. However, each player has incomplete information about the actions of
the other players, which are also not revealed ex-post (so it is impossible to
write a contract contingent on the actions of others). The negotiating players
hold passive beliefs about the actions of other players, that is, they do not revise
their beliefs about any other’s action when receive an oﬀer diﬀerent from what
they expected in equilibrium. Furthermore, it is assumed that actions satisfy
feasibility, which means that the following conditions hold for all subgraphs
K ⊆ L and for any link (ij) ∈ K:
ui(  x(K)) −
 
j∈N




Under these conditions, as σ → 1, the game has a unique perfect Bayesian equi-
librium, in which the players’s actions satisfy conditions of bilateral eﬃciency:
  xij = argmax
xij
(ui(xij,  x\  xij) + uj(xij,  x\  xij)), if ij ∈ L,
  xij = 0, if ij / ∈ L,























Here P denotes a partition of N players into coalitions, PN is a set of all
partitions, S and S′ are coalitions in P, |.| is the notation for the number of
26elements in the respective set of elements, LP is the partitioned graph (the
graph what contains all links of L connecting the members of the same coalition
within P, but excludes those connecting the members of diﬀerent coalitions),
and   v(S,LP) =
 
i∈S ui(  x) are the total industry proﬁts on a partitioned graph
LP.
It can be shown that these payoﬀs satisfy the attractive properties of fairness
and eﬃciency (Myerson, 1977a):
Φi(K) − Φi(K\ij) = Φj(K) − Φj(K\ij), (7)
 
i
Φi(K) =   v(K).
The ﬁrst equation expresses the fairness of each bilateral bargaining relation:
both parties have an equal amount to gain from closing the contract. The
second equation expresses the fact that all the payments sum up to the industry
proﬁts, taking into account the various competitive externalities that the ﬁrms
impose on each other. Recursive substitution of these equations gives the payoﬀs
expressed by the generalized Myerson-Shapley value (6).
Note, that De Fontenay and Gans (2005) apply this model in the context of
Cournot competition, in which the secret joint actions x (quantities supplied)
fully determine the industry production, and hence also the outcome of the
quantity competition downstream. In our application, the contracts are simpler:
they only specify a transfer payment, for which the hospital has to deliver its
services at its marginal cost, and do not specify secret joint actions. This means
that the quantities supplied are not restricted in contracts. Therefore, after
signing such contracts in Stage 1 of the game, the insurers will still have to
compete for consumers in the downstream market in Stage 2. Therefore, in our
game, the industry proﬁts are determined as the outcome of the Hotelling game
between the insurers in Stage 2.
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